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TAXATION - Federal Estate Tax and State Inheritance Tax - Sufficiency of
a Testamentary Tax Directive to Defeat the Operation of the Uniform
Estate Tax Apportionment Act - In re Ogburn's Estate, 406 P.2d 655
(Wyo. 1965).

The decedent's estate consisted of joint property and
insurance proceeds in addition to property which passed under
her will.' In the first provision of her will, testatrix directed
the payment of "all mj just debts, taxes, funeral expenses and
expense of administration of my estate."'2 The remaining
provisions in the will consisted of two specific bequests and
a residuary bequest. The Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, adopted by the Wyoming Legislature in 1959,' provides for apportionment of the federal estate tax among all
the beneficiaries to the estate according to the value of their
respective interests unless a contrary intention is manifested
in the will. In administering the Ogburn Estate, the executor
charged all of the federal estate and state inheritance taxes
to the residue of the probate estate. The District Court approved the executor's accounting procedure and held the tax
directive indicated an intention that the residue should bear
all federal estate and state inheritance taxes. On appeal the
Supreme Court of Wyoming held that a testamentary provision 'directing payment of "all my taxes of my estate" is
sufficient to direct non-apportionment of federal estate taxes
due on account of property included in decedent's probate
estate but does not extend to non-testamentary property.
There are two types of taxes connected with the transfer
of property at death, estate taxes and inheritance taxes.
Estate taxes are taxes on the privilege of transmitting property at death4 and hence fall on the estate as such. The
federal estate tax5 is the primary example of this type of tax
although some states have also adopted this manner of taxation exclusively 6 while others have an estate tax to supplement the state inheritance tax.7 Inheritance taxes are taxes
1. All of this property was includible in decedent's gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2031, 2033, 2040, 2042.
2. In re. Ogburn's Estate, 406 P.2d 655, 657 (Wyo. 1965) (Emphasis added.).
(Hereinafter referred to as
3. Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-336 to -346 (Supp. 1965).
the Uniform Act.).
4. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
5. INT. REY. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2001-2209.
6. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 198.02 -.03 (1963).
7. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 291.34 (1961).
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on the right of one to succeed to property passing at death.
This is the type of tax usually levied at the state level.8 Estate
taxes, which are levied on the right to transmit property at
death, present an apportionment problem because they are
levied on the estate as a whole. The inheritance taxes, unlike
estate taxes, are self-apportioning because they are levied on
the interest of the person succeeding to the property rather
than on the estate. However, a testator always has the right
to direct in his will what fund will be used to pay either
estate taxes or inheritance taxes.'
Absent a tax directive, there are two rules concerning
how the estate taxes should be apportioned, the residue rule
and the apportionment rule. The residue rule, the majority
rule at common law,"0 provides that the residue of the probate estate should bear the estate tax on the assumption that
the testator intended the specific devises and legacies be
given undiminished by taxes. The apportionment rule, which
developed as a minority view at common law," has also been
established by statute in many states."2 Essentially, the apportionment rule provides that each beneficiary shall be
taxed that part of the total estate tax which bears the same
ratio as the beneficiary's interest bears to the total estate.
The principle of apportionment of estate taxes according to
the value of each beneficiary's interest finally culminated
in the Uniform Act. 8
The problem in the principal case is whether the tax
'directive was sufficient to defeat, in whole or in part, the
operation of the Uniform Act concerning the apportionment
8. The state inheritance tax statutes in Wyoming are: WYo. STAT. §§ 39-336,
-337 (1957).
9. In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317 (1953); In re Bourquin's
Estate, 87 Colo. 144, 286 Pac. 114 (1930).
10. Sutter, Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax in the Absence of Statute
or an Expression of Intention, 51 MICH. L. REv. 53 (1952); Fleming,
Apportionment of FederalEstate Taxes, 43 ILL. L. REv. 153, 159 (1948).
11. In re Gallagher's Will, supra note 9.
12. E.g., CAL. PROH. CODH § 971. State apportionment statutes were upheld as
constitutional in Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
13. The crux of the act is found in Wyo. STAT. § 2-338 (Supp. 1965) wherein
it is provided: "Tax to be apportioned among all persons interested.-Unless
the will otherwise provides, the tax shall be apportioned among all persons
interested in the estate. The apportionment shall be made in proportion
that the value of the interest of each person interested in the estate bears
to the total value of the interests of all persons interested in the estate.
The values used in determining the tax shall be used for that purpose."
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of estate taxes.1" The appellee in this case contended that
the tax directive was sufficient to defeat the operation of the
Uniform Act with respect to the whole estate."5 Appellants
contended that the directive was so ambiguous as to be of no
effect and therefore the Uniform Act should have applied
to the whole estate." The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected
both arguments and based its decision on the accepted rules
of construction as applied to the words used in the tax directive. The court reasoned the tax directive manifested an
intention that at least part of the taxes were to be paid out
of the residuary estate. 7 However, the court indicated that
because the words "all my taxes" were qualified by the words
"of my estate," the testatrix meant only her probate estate
and not her estate for federal estate tax purposes." The
question of whether the state inheritance tax 9 came within
the testatrix's tax directive presented no problem to the court.
As the words 'directing payment of "all my taxes" were qualified by the words "of my estate," the court found her intention was that only estate taxes were to be included in the directive and not the Wyoming state inheritance tax." Thus, the
court arrived at the conclusion the tax directive indicated
only that estate taxes on the probate estate should be borne
by the residuary devisees and legatees while the bur'den of
paying the balance of the taxes should have been left to the
operation of law.
The compromise reached by the court in the principal
case appears to be the product of a struggle between two
opposing rules of construction. The court acknowledges the
14. See Wyo. STAT. § 2-337 (a) (Supp. 1965) for the scope of the Uniform Act.
Therein "estate" is defined as "the gross estate of a decedent as determined
for the purpose of federal estate tax."
15. In re Ogburn's Estate, supra note 2, at 656.
16. Id. at 658-59.
17. Id. at 659; Annot. 37 A.L.R.2d 7, 124 (1954). It is not entirely clear to the
author that this annotation supports the conclusion the court reached here.
18. ld. at 659-61. The proposition that the words "my estate" when contained
in a will provision mean only the testator's probate estate is supported
by reason and clearly established by prior case law. Norton v. Jones, 210
S.W.2d 820, 821-2 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Union Trust v. Watson, 76 R.I.
223, 68 A.2d 916, 919 (1949).
19. Supra note 8.
20. In re Ogburn's Estate, supra note 2, at 661, citing In re Young's Estate,
33 Wyo. 317, 321-23, 239 Pac. 286, 287 (1925). Therein the Wyoming
Supreme Court distinguished the state inheritance tax for which the interests of the individual beneficiaries are liable from an estate tax for
which the whole estate is liable.
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view that in order to defeat the Uniform Act, there must have
been a clear and unambiguous manifestation of intention
against statutory apportionment or "the burden of the taxes
must be left where the law places it.""1 That the lack of clarity
in the tax directive was self-evident was admitted by the
court. 2 However, the court also recognized the well established rule concerning will construction, that there is a presumption all parts of a will have meaning or will be given
meaning in so far as consistent with the will when read as
a whole.2 In this way the court reached the conclusion that
notwithstanding the fact that the tax directive was ambiguous,
the tax directive meant something and would not be treated
as mere surplusage.2
At this point the court commenced to ascertain the meaning of the will directive. Two questions were dealt with: (1)
whether the tax burden was shifted by the clause, and (2) to
what extent the death taxes were affected by the 'directive.
The Court's conclusion that the tax directive applied only
to the estate tax on probate assets is well established by the
authorities and is not questioned here; however, it is not
entirely clear that the tax directive was sufficient to shift the
estate tax burden solely to the residuary estate.
An introductory clause directing the payment of all just
debts and expenses without designation of a fund from which
to pay them, is commonly used in drafting a will"' but is
generally regarded as ritualistic and meaningless.2" The clause
in the Ogburn case was a clause of this type except that it
also provided for the payment of taxes. In reaching the conclusion that the tax directive was effective to shift the tax
burden to the residuary estate, the court relied on an annoId. at 658.
Id. at 658-59.
Id. at 658; Succession of Jones, 172 So. 2d 312, 316 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
Id. at 659.
13 AM. JuR. LEGAL FORMS ANN. Form 13:1771 to :1779 (1955); MODERN
LEGAL FORMS § 9656 (1965).
26. In 'e Porter's Estate, 138 Cal. 618, 72 Pac. 173, 174 (1903); Annot. 87
A.L.R.2d 7, 136 (1954).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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tation" stating the rule that "where . . . there is a general
direction ... to pay all debts, expenses . .. and taxes, there
is an implied direction that the taxes are to be paid from the
fund which also bears the burden of debts and expenses of
administration." The rationale for the rule stated above is
that a specification for the payment of taxes ordinarily has
no place in such an introductory clause and must have been
deliberately inserted there for a special purpose.2 8 In Wyoming, according to statute, the burden of payment of debts
and expenses is apportioned among all the beneficiaries of
the probate estate "but specific devises or legacies are exempt
from such liability, if it appears to the court necessary to
carry into effect the intention of the testator, and there is
other sufficient estate." 9 It is notable with regard to the
'debt and expense liability statute that, in order to exempt
the specific bequests from liability, it is not required that
the testator manifest an intention contrary to apportionment
but only that the bequests will be exempted if the court feels
it is necessary to effectuate the testator's intention."0 The
court relied wholly on the rule cited above from the annotation
to support its findings that the residuary estate should pay
the tax on probate assets. It isimportant to note that there
was no discussion of the statute just cited concerning liability
for debts and expenses in the principal case. This is surprising in view of the relevance of the statute to the rule relied
on by the court. In the event the statute was considered, it
is not clear from a reading of the principal case what the
determining factor was which made the court feel that the
testatrix 's intention would have been frustrated by apportionment of the debts and expenses among all beneficiaries.
An indication that the court is not disposed to interfere
with specific legacies or devises is found in the case of Dixon
27. Annot. 37 A.L.R.2d 7, 124 (1954) (Emphasis added.). Therein § 35 is
entitled: "Effect of single direction to pay debts, expenses of administration,
and taxes without designating fund which is liable." Starr v. Watrous, 116
Conn. 448, 165 Atl. 459 (1933), the first illustrative case in § 35 of the
annotation, placed the tax burden on the residuary estate, but in that
jurisdiction, the rule was that debts and expenses should be paid out of
the residuary estate.
28. Starr v. Watrous, supra note 27.
29. WYO. STAT. § 2-297 (1957) (Emphasis added.).
30. It would appear that, in view of the way in which the debt liability statute
is worded, the court rather than being restricted to the construction of the
will, is allowed to second-guess the testator.
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v. Dixon.8 Therein the court approved the policy that the
provisions in the will should be disturbed as little as possible
when a spouse elects to take the forced share. The rationale
appears to be that to take property from a specific bequest
to satisfy a statutory forced share would be to do harm to
the testator's intent. Reasoning in this way, the result reached in the principal case may be justified. That is, on the basis
of the Dixon case, the court could have found it necessary to
exempt the specific bequests in order to effectuate the testatrix's intention. This rational works very well when applied
to an estate such as the one in the principal case, which contained only specific bequests and a residuary bequest; however, it breaks down in a case where a general bequest is
added. A literal reading of the debt and expense liability
statute would seem to indicate that in Wyoming general and
residuary bequests abate together. The debt liability statute
clearly makes the court the guardian of the testator's intent;
but even in view of the Dixon case, the statute only allows specific bequests to be exempted.
It would appear that the rule of the Dixon case must be
limited by the statute. To say that general bequests should
be preferred over residuary bequests in order to effectuate
the testator's intention even on the authority of the Dixon
case would be to contradict the positive mandate of the statute. At any rate, in view of the court's apparent disregard
for the debt and expense liability statute, there is clearly a
need for further clarification on the matter of abatement in
Wyoming.
The principal case illustrates the importance of drafting
a clear and unambiguous directive which embraces all tax
consequences of transmitting property at death. The residuary estate in this case contained $96,000 of a total estate of
$270,000. Had it been found that the residuary estate was to
bear the burden of all the federal estate tax, as would have
been the case if the directive had been construed as indicating
an intent to charge the residuary the total tax for the estate,
or if this case had occurred in a jurisdiction following the
residue rule, the residuary share would have been reduced
81. 78 Wyo. 236, 250-51, 278 P.2d 258, 262 (1954).
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from $96,000 to $23,740. Approximately three-fourths of the
residuary estate would have been taken for the payment of
taxes. This result appears especially inequitable in the case
where the residuary beneficiaries are the testator's spouse
or children, who are generally the natural objects of his
bounty. Such a result is what the Uniform Act and other
apportionment statutes were meant to prevent. These statutes
are effective to this end in a situation where there is no tax
clause. However, in view of the fact that the testator is still
given the power to direct what fund will pay the tax, these
statutes may be foiled by unclear tax clauses. The clause
considered in the principle case was admittedly such a clause.2"
It is important that one drawing up a will consult an attorney;
but it is even more important that the attorney advise his
client as to the tax consequences involved in the disposition
of the client's property at death. In order to protect adequately his client, an attorney should be able to draw up a clear and
comprehensive tax clause concerning the entire estate, testamentary and non-testamentary, to the end that his client's
wishes will not be subject to defeat 'due to unclear or inadequate information in the tax clause.
R. MICHAEL MULLIKIN

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Waiver of Governmental Immunity -

Defec-

tive Traffic Control Devices. Fanning v. City of Laramie, 402 P.2d 460
(Wyo.

1965).

Plaintiff's son was killed at an intersection of a through
street. In a suit against the City of Laramie, it was alleged
that the proximate cause of the accident was due to the city's
failure to remove limbs and foliage of trees which obscured
a stop sign and thereby created a condition dangerous to
motorists. The complaint was dismissed by the trial court on
the grounds that the city possessed governmental immunity
from suit. Upon appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held
82. In re Ogburn's Estate, supra note 2, at 658.
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